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ARGUMENT1 
As stated in the principal briefs, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 (1) provides: 
A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any 
violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or patient 
communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a 
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. That duty shall be discharged 
if the therapist makes reasonable efforts to communicate the threat to the victim, 
and notifies a law enforcement officer or agency of the threat. 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the statute, which precludes the 
imposition of a duty "to warn or take precautions to provide protection from" the violent 
behavior of a client except under certain circumstances, also eliminates a therapist's duty 
of reasonable care when she undertakes an affirmative act. 
Appellants discussed at length in their initial brief the material difference between 
seeking to impose liability for a failure to act and seeking to impose liability for 
negligently performing an affirmative act. (See Brief of Appellants, pp. 11-13.) By its 
terms, Section 78-14a-102(1) applies only to the former; it precludes the imposition of an 
affirmative duty of a therapist to act, except under specific circumstances. Nowhere does 
it address, let alone eliminate, a therapist's duty to act reasonably when she does act. 
The Clinic implicitly recognizes this distinction, arguing that affirmatively 
misrepresenting a fact is really just a failure "to ensure the completeness and accuracy of 
1
 The Clinic begins its brief with a summary of facts from the plaintiffs' complaint. On 
appeal from a motion to dismiss, the appellants are entitled to have the matter decided 
based on all allegations in the complaint, along with reasonable inferences therefrom. 
Accordingly, the dispositive facts are those set forth in the Robinsons' opening brief. 
1 
information. . . . "[T]he 'essence and substance' of Plaintiffs' claim here is that Ms. 
Harris should have taken precautions to protect Plaintiffs which she did not take, 
'ascertaining whether the patient was carrying a concealed weapon/ and responding 
accurately to the dispatcher's question." (Brief of Appellee, pp. 4, 6-7.) 
The Clinic's theory would eviscerate the long line of Utah authority distinguishing 
nonfeasance and misfeasance. Performing an affirmative act unreasonably would simply 
be recharacterized as a "failure to act" reasonably. The Clinic's argument is like saying 
that driving one's car into a pedestrian is really a failure to act because it involves a 
failure to apply one's brakes. The argument does not pass the common-sense test. 
The wording of Section 78-14a-102(1) is unambiguous, and does not address or 
limit liability for acts of affirmative negligence. Because the statutory language is plain, 
the inquiry should go no further. Appellants note, however, that a memorandum in the 
legislative history file appears to make clear that the statute was intended solely to address 
claims of nonfeasance. See Addendum Exh. A hereto.2 
According to the Legislative Memorandum, Section 78-14a-102 was enacted in 
response to a California Supreme Court decision, Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of 
California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976). See also Michael R. 
Gerske, "Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of 
2
 The bill was originally proposed in 1987 by Rep. Irby Arrington, but was not passed 
until 1988. The memorandum was prepared for the 1987 session, but because the 1988 
bill was "identical," it is instructive as to legislative intent with respect to that bill as well. 
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their Patients,55 64 Ind L. J. 391, 392 n.5 (Spring 1988/1989) (identifying Utah as one of 
ten states enacting legislation to counteract Tarasoff). In Tarasoff, the California 
Supreme Court held that a "special relationship55 existed between a therapist and a third-
party victim if the therapist knew "or should have known55 that his patient posed a threat 
to the third party. Accordingly, the court held, a duty to warn the victim existed. 
Tarasoff "created an exception to the general rule under the common law, which 
states that a person does not have an affirmative duty to act to protect others even if 
action by a particular person is necessary to prevent harm.55 Allison L. Almason, 
"Personal Liability Implications of the Duty to Warn are Hard Pills to Swallow: From 
Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and Beyond,5513J. Contemp. Health. L. & Poly 471, 474 
(Spring 1997) (noting that Tarasoff creates "liability for nonfeasance55 by finding the 
existence of a "special relationship55). 
The Legislative Memorandum stated (with underlining in the original), "This bill, 
and similar statutes in other states is designed to define a therapist's duty to warn and take 
precautions, when a threat has been made, and to reasonably limit his liability if he fulfills 
that duty.55 The Memorandum attached a copy of California's post-Tarasoff statute, Cal. 
Civil Code § 43.92, which contained wording similar to that enacted in Utah. Id. 
What California's statute (and Utah's Section 78-14a-102) accomplished was the 
preclusion of any alleged duty to warn where a therapist merely "should have known" of 
a threat, but does not have actual knowledge. See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 
864, 120 Cal.App.4th 807 (discussing history of California's post- Tarasoff statute; stating 
3 
that "Section 43.92 . . . eliminates the 'should have determined' component and provides 
immunity to therapists for failure to warn, except where the plaintiff can show that the 
patient actually communicated to his therapist a serious threat of physical violence against 
an identifiable victim"). 
In addition to California's law, the Legislative Memorandum noted that similar 
statutes had been enacted in Colorado, New Hampshire, Kentucky, and Louisiana. 
Consistent with their origins, courts in those jurisdictions characterize their versions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102 as "duty to warn" statutes. See, e.g., Halverson v. Pikes 
Peak Family Counseling and Mental Health Center, 795 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Colo. App. 
1990) (characterizing § 13-21-117, C.R.S. (as "granting] immunity from liability to 
health care providers for their failure to warn others of a patient's dangerous propensities 
or his generalized threats of violence against unspecified persons"); Dunnington v. Silva, 
916 So.2d 1166, 1168 -69 (La. App. 2005) (characterizing LSA-R.S. 9:2800.2 as a "duty 
to warn" statute); Powell v. Catholic Medical Center, 145 N. H. 7, 749 A.2d 301 (2000) 
(stating, with regard to N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 329:31, that "[t]he subject matter 
embraced by RSA 329:31 is limited to a physician's duty to warn of a client's violent 
behavior when the client has communicated a serious threat of physical violence against a 
clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim"). 
Section 78-14a-102(1) is a duty-to-warn statute. This is not a duty-to-warn case. 
The statute simply does not apply. Ironically, however, it does lend indirect support to 
the Robinsons' contention that the legislature did not intend to immunize the negligent 
4 
performance of an existing duty. In the final sentence of Section 78- 14a-102(1), the 
statute provides that, when a duty to warn has arisen, the therapist is required to act 
reasonably in fulfilling it. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (therapist must make 
"reasonable efforts" to warn upon receipt of specific threat). The same principle applies 
here: A duty, once it has arisen, must be performed non-negligently. 
In arguing that Section 78-14a-102(1) should immunize alleged affirmative 
negligence, the Clinic cites Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998). 
In that case, the plaintiffs sued Valley Mental Health, alleging that the clinic owed their 
daughter and grandson a duty to warn and/or protect them from the violent actions of a 
patient whom it misdiagnosed as non-threatening. "They argue that because Valley 
-5 
Another reason why it makes little sense to apply Section 78-14a-102 in this case is that 
accurately reporting whether a person has a weapon or not, or that it is unknown whether 
the person has a weapon, does not involve the application of medical training or skill. 
The fact that the employee making the phone call happens to be a therapist rather than the 
receptionist is largely fortuitous. The New Hampshire Supreme Court made a similar 
observation in Powell, supra. After concluding that a duty to warn existed under its 
statute, the court rejected the defendant's argument that his compliance with that duty 
should be measured by a "reasonable professional" standard, rather than a "reasonable 
person" standard. Once a duty of reasonable care existed, the court said, it was "an 
ordinary duty of care case. It is only fortuitous that one of the defendants is a physician. 
Specialized training and experience do not excuse a physician from exercising the 
reasonable care of an ordinary person." 749 A.2d at 306. See also Geske, 64 Ind L. J. at 
417-418 ("The task of warning or taking precautions against a person's violent behavior 
presupposed no particular professional skill or training. . . . Any person faced with a 
threat which triggers the statutory duty could be expected to choose a reasonable response 
to the threat to protect an identifiable person. . . . Requiring a professional to choose 
reasonably among alternative warnings or precautions to protect reasonably identifiable 
persons depending on the circumstances demands no more from the professional than the 
reasonable care required of all persons in carrying out their legal duties.") 
5 
Mental Helth failed to treat Kilgrow it failed to discover the threat to Jayleen and the 
children/' the Court summarized. "Therefore, a duty to Jayleen and her children exists 
under the common law because Valley Mental Health should have known of the threat 
Kilgrow posed." Id. at 419. 
The Wilsons' claims were barred by Section 78-14a-102(1), the Court held, 
because the statute eliminated the common law extension of a duty to warn in situations 
where a therapist merely "should have known" of a danger. "[U]nder our case law a duty 
may . . . exist where a therapist 'should have known' of the danger to a clearly identified 
or reasonably identifiable victim," the Wilson court explained. "That is, our case law may 
allow the imposition of a duty where, because of the defendant's negligent treatment, a 
threat to a reasonably identifiable victim is not discovered." Id. at 420. 
The statute, by contrast, narrowed the circumstances under which such a duty 
could be imposed. "[T]he statute requires actual knowledge of a threat to a reasonably 
identifiable victim," the Court wrote. "There is no liability under the statute where the 
claim is that a therapist 'should have known' of the threat to a clearly identified or 
reasonably identifiable victim." Id. 
It was uncontroverted in Wilson that the patient had not communicated a specific 
threat, the Court noted. Under the statute, therefore, no duty to warn the daughter or 
grandson existed, and the plaintiff could not impose such a duty by arguing that a "special 
relationship" existed between the parties. Wilson has no bearing on the Robinsons' claim 
in this case. 
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The Clinic also argues that Boon v. Rivera, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 80 Cal.App.4th 
1322 (2000), which recognized a common law duty of reasonable care when requesting 
the services of law enforcement, is distinguishable. The Clinic states that Boon focused 
on the existence of a specific threat to an identifiable party. That portion of the court's 
analysis, however, related to the plaintiffs "special relationship" argument, which the 
court said was irrelevant to claims of affirmative negligence. 80 Cal.App.4th at 1332. 
See also Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ^ 20, 997 P.3d 305 ("An act of misfeasance 
may constitute actionable negligence without reliance on a special relationship to impose 
an affirmative duty to act."). The Clinic does not dispute the separate holding in Boon 
that, under the common law, a person has a duty not to negligently misrepresent material 
facts to law enforcement. 
The Clinic also notes that the California Court of Appeal declined to apply Boon in 
Alvarez v. Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp., Ill Cal.Rptr.2d 890, 100 Cal.App.4th 1190 
(2002). In Alvarez, the defendant called 911 and "did not provide information to the 
police which may have been pertinent to their deciding how to handle the situation." Id. 
Thus, the defendant's alleged negligence was not saying something. In that context, the 
Court of Appeal correctly distinguished Boon and another California Supreme Court 
decision, Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 728, 268 Cal.Rptr. 779, 789 P.2d 960 
(1990), because those cases involved allegations of affirmative acts rather than 
nonfeasance - the very distinction argued by appellants in this case. See id., 100 
Cal.Rptr.4th at 1213. 
7 
Garcia further illustrates the point. In that case, the supreme court upheld a 
negligence cause of action against a parole officer who falsely told a potential victim that 
a released criminal posed no threat to her. The court rejected the defendant's argument 
that he owed no duty to inform the victim of a parolee's dangerousness. "Ordinarily, of 
course, law enforcement personnel have no duty to volunteer information about released 
criminals under their supervision," the court agreed. "Nevertheless, the absence of a duty 
to speak does not entitle one to speak falsely. . . . [W]e conclude that Ybarra, having 
chosen to communicate information about Johnson to Morales, had a duty to use 
reasonable care in doing so." Id, 789 P.2d at 964. 
The Clinic next argues that, "Although Plaintiffs characterize Ms. Harris' 
statement that the patient did not have a gun as an 'affirmative misrepresentation,' they 
cannot allege she actually knew that the patient had concealed a gun on his person." 
(Brief of Appellee, p. 9.) That is similar to the claim in Garcia. No allegation was made 
there that the parole officer actually knew that a threat existed and lied about it. In this 
case, even under the Clinic's theory, the reasonable - the accurate - response would have 
been, "I don't know," rather than a positive assurance that the patient did not have a 
weapon. To a law enforcement officer (or anyone, really), there is a material difference 
between being told there is a possibility of a weapon and being told there is no weapon. 
Finally, the Clinic argues that it would be "poor policy" to require a defendant to 
act reasonably when providing information to law enforcement. (Brief of Appellee, p. 
11.) "Rather, public policy is served when therapists needing assistance in potentially 
8 
dangerous situations are encouraged to summon aid from police who are trained to deal 
with such situations, regardless of how the call for assistance might be characterized after 
the fact," appellee argues. Id. 
It must be remembered that all the Robinsons are asking, and all that other courts 
require, is reasonableness under the circumstances. How can it be good public policy to 
allow unreasonable behavior when making statements upon which law enforcement will 
rely? Rather, appellants submit that the public policy arguments in this case cut in their 
favor. Shouldn't the courts adopt a position that prevents law enforcement officers from 
being unnecessarily placed in harm's way by requiring that reasonably accurate 
information be provided to them? 
With respect to "how the call for assistance might be characterized after the fact," 
that is a question for the factfinder. A jury will consider the individual circumstances of 
each particular case, including any extenuating circumstances cited by the defendant. 
See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80 (Utah App. 1987) (upholding jury finding of 50 
percent comparative fault even though the plaintiff was confronted with an emergency 
created by the defendant) ("The jury, pursuant to those instructions, apparently found that 
under the circumstances appellant was negligent in failing to reasonably keep his vehicle 
under control and/or maintain a reasonably safe speed. The finding of negligence took 
into account, as part of the circumstances, that appellant was suddenly confronted with 
defendants vehicle straddling the center line."). (Emphasis in original.) 
9 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in applying Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) to claims based 
upon affirmative misconduct. Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reverse the trial 
court's judgment and remand the case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisofl day of May, 2007. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
William J. Hansen 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
10 
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